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imaging studies that have linked high CGp activity to decline in 
task engagement (Weissman et al., 2006). Finally, CGp lesions in 
rodents and rabbits impair several forms of associative learning 
(Gabriel and Sparenborg, 1987; Bussey et al., 1996).
Adjudicating between these two possibilities is difficult because 
motivational variables associated with cognitive control may cov-
ary with valuation (Pearce and Hall, 1980; Maunsell, 2004; Rangel 
et al., 2008). We tested these two hypotheses by dissociating the 
subjective value of an option as revealed by choice preference from 
the degree to which that option differed from a standard, herein 
defined as decision salience. Monkeys made decisions in three dis-
tinct contexts, each offering a choice between options differing in 
a single relevant variable: risk (McCoy and Platt, 2005), delay to 
reward (Hwang et al., 2009; Louie and Glimcher, 2010), and the 
potential to acquire social information at a juice cost (Deaner et al., 
2005; Klein et al., 2008). Each variable assumed one of three differ-
ent levels of decision salience (i.e., risk, delay, or price). We found 
that, across decision contexts, neuronal activity was uncorrelated 
with subjective value as estimated from choice frequencies. Instead, 
firing rates reflected decision salience, the degree of deviance of a 
chosen option from the standard. Our findings thus argue against 
the subjective value hypothesis and support the idea that CGp con-
tributes to the motivational allocation of cognitive resources – in 
part by signaling decision salience.
Materials and Methods
Two male rhesus macaques participated in this experiment (mon-
keys N and S). Monkeys began each trial by fixating on a central 
square. Following a fixation period (2 s for monkey N, 0.3–2 s for 
monkey S), they were required to shift gaze to one of two eccentric 
targets. After a successful gaze shift, a fluid or a fluid plus social 
reward was delivered (see Figure 1A). On each trial, the monkeys 
introduction
Although  posterior  cingulate  cortex  (CGp)  dysfunction  is 
  associated with both Alzheimer’s Disease (Minoshima et al., 1997; 
Hirono et al., 1998; Yoshiura et al., 2002) and schizophrenia (Newell 
et al., 2006, 2007), the cognitive function of this brain area remains 
unclear. Neuroimaging studies (Maddock et al., 2003; Buckner and 
Vincent, 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Luhmann et al., 2008), 
lesion studies (Gabriel et al., 1991; Bussey et al., 1996), and neuro-
physiological studies (McCoy et al., 2003; McCoy and Platt, 2005; 
Hayden et al., 2008; Pearson et al., 2009) support two distinct func-
tional roles for CGp in decision making.
On one hand, correlations between neural activity and indi-
vidual decision preferences suggest CGp contributes to decision 
making by signaling the subjective value of a chosen option (McCoy 
and Platt, 2005; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Levy et al., 2011). Indeed, 
firing rates of neurons in this area track the subjective value of 
preferred risky options in a choice task (McCoy and Platt, 2005), 
and BOLD signal correlates with the subjective value of a delayed 
option in an inter-temporal choice task (Kable and Glimcher, 2007).
However, modulations in neural activity by task engagement, 
learning, and memory suggest CGp plays a more fundamental 
role in the allocation of neural resources to cognitive control akin 
to that of attention in the selective processing of sensory stimuli 
(Maddock et al., 2001, 2003; Greicius et al., 2004; Luhmann et al., 
2008). Firing rates of CGp neurons are modulated by the omission 
of predicted rewards as well as larger than average rewards (McCoy 
et al., 2003), signal whether monkeys will switch from a preferred 
option to a non-preferred one (Hayden et al., 2008), and predict 
when monkeys will strategically shift from exploiting an option 
with known value to learning about alternatives (Pearson et al., 
2009). Moreover, increased tonic firing rates in CGp predict lapses 
in task performance (Hayden et al., 2009), corroborating brain 
Decision salience signals in posterior cingulate cortex
Sarah R. Heilbronner1*, Benjamin Y. Hayden1 and Michael L. Platt1,2
1  Department of Neurobiology, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
2  Department of Evolutionary Anthropology, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
Despite its phylogenetic antiquity and clinical importance, the posterior cingulate cortex (CGp) 
remains an enigmatic nexus of attention, memory, motivation, and decision making. Here we 
show that CGp neurons track decision salience – the degree to which an option differs from a 
standard – but not the subjective value of a decision.  To do this, we recorded the spiking activity 
of CGp neurons in monkeys choosing between options varying in reward-related risk, delay to 
reward, and social outcomes, each of which varied in level of decision salience. Firing rates were 
higher when monkeys chose the risky option, consistent with their risk-seeking preferences, 
but were also higher when monkeys chose the delayed and social options, contradicting their 
preferences.  Thus, across decision contexts, neuronal activity was uncorrelated with how much 
monkeys valued a given option, as inferred from choice. Instead, neuronal activity signaled 
the deviation of the chosen option from the standard, independently of how it differed. The 
observed decision salience signals suggest a role for CGp in the flexible allocation of neural 
resources to motivationally significant information, akin to the role of attention in selective 
processing of sensory inputs.
Keywords: reward, cingulate, salience, decision making, motivation, risk, discounting
Edited by:
Tobias Kalenscher, University of 
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Reviewed by:
Bruno B. Averbeck, National Institute of 
Mental Health, USA
Geoffrey Schoenbaum, University of 
Maryland School of Medicine, USA
*Correspondence:
Sarah R. Heilbronner, Department of 
Neurobiology, Levine Science 
Research Center, Duke University 
Medical School, Box 90999, Research 
Drive, Durham, NC 27710, USA.  
e-mail: sarah.heilbronner@duke.edu
www.frontiersin.org  April 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 55  |  1
Original research article
published: 19 April 2011
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2011.00055associated with the large reward could be small (1 s), medium (2 s), 
or large (3 s), depending on the condition. The final context was 
a social decision making task based loosely on the “pay-per-view” 
task described previously (Deaner et al., 2005; Klein et al., 2008), 
in which monkeys chose between a large amount of juice without 
an associated picture (200 μL) or a smaller amount of juice paired 
with a small photograph of a familiar monkey. The amount of juice 
associated with the picture could be either small (120 μL juice), 
medium (147 μL of juice), or large (173 μL of juice), depending 
on the condition. In contrast with previous studies, photographs 
of different monkeys with different ranks within the colony were 
randomly interleaved. The safe option (risk context), immediate 
option (delay context), and non-picture option (social context) 
were identical, so we refer to this as the standard option. Thus, a 
standard option was available on every choice, and the identity of 
the non-standard (outlier) option determined the decision context 
and level.
Each block consisted of 11 to 21 trials; the specific number was 
chosen randomly so as to prevent the monkey from guessing when 
the block would end. Each block contained choices belonging to 
only one of the nine possible conditions (three levels and three 
contexts). Each block began with a forced-choice trial in which 
only the outlier option was available. This trial served to inform 
the subject about the new block’s context and level. In addition, the 
color of the central fixation square was associated with the   decision 
chose  between  a  standard  target,  offering  an  immediate,  safe, 
medium-sized reward (200 μL of juice) with no social reward and 
another, non-standard reward. The identity of this second reward 
option determined the trial type and varied in blocks. Following 
reward delivery, an inter-trial interval (ITI) began. The ITI was 
5 s in all trials except choices of the delayed option, in which case 
it was adjusted such that the total trial length for delay trials was 
approximately the same as all other trials.
Each trial offered one of three possible decision salience levels 
within three possible trial types. Thus there were nine trial types 
(see Figure 1B). Monkeys completed at least two blocks each (one 
for each side of the monitor) of the nine trial types within each 
session. The first trial type gave monkeys a choice between a sure 
reward and risky gamble on a larger or smaller reward (McCoy and 
Platt, 2005). We defined risk as the coefficient of variation (CV) in 
reward value, to permit easy comparison with other studies. While 
the safe option remained the same across all three levels (200 μL of 
juice), the risky option could be either high risk (280 μL 50% of the 
time; 120 μL 50% of the time), medium risk (253 μL of juice 50% 
of the time; 147 μL of juice 50% of the time), or low risk (227 μL of 
juice 50% of the time; 173 μL of juice 50% of the time). The second 
context was a form of a standard delay discounting task (Mazur, 
1987; Ainslie and Haslam, 1992; Kim et al., 2008). Monkeys chose 
between a small, immediately available reward (200 μL of juice – the 
standard) and a large, delayed reward (233 μL of juice). The delay 
Figure 1 | Task design and decision contexts. (A) Trial events. Trials began 
when a central fixation light appeared. Once the monkeys looked at the fixation 
light, it changed color to indicate the current context. After a stable fixation 
period, the fixation light extinguished, and two eccentric yellow dots appeared. 
When the monkey had shifted gaze to one of these targets, the reward period 
began. Juice was either delivered immediately, or, in the case of LL choices, 
after some delay. An adjusting delay followed such that all trials were of 
approximately the same total length. (B) Reward matrix showing outlier 
outcomes for each level of each context. All recording sessions included blocks 
composed of one of nine trial types: three conditions (risk, delay, social), each 
with three levels. Clock indicates delay to reward, the droplet indicates amount 
of juice delivered, and the picture indicates that a social reward was presented 
just before juice delivery. The standard option was always 200 μL of juice 
available immediately, with no picture.
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We used an alpha of 0.05 as a criterion for significance. Peri-
stumulus time histograms (PSTHs) were constructed by aligning 
spikes to saccade offset, averaging across trials, and smooth-
ing with a 200-ms boxcar. Statistics were performed on binned 
firing rates, as described for each analysis. To compare firing 
rates across trials for single neurons, tests were performed on 
individual trials; to compare firing rates across neurons, tests 
were performed on average rates for individual neurons. The 
post-reward epoch was 900 ms, beginning at the completion 
of reward delivery. The pre-saccadic (pre-choice) epoch was 
900 ms, beginning 1300 ms prior to saccade completion. The 
peri-saccadic epoch was 400 ms, ending at the completion of the 
saccadic. Analyses were performed using Matlab (Mathworks, 
Natick, MA, USA).
The main subjective value model was based on a model used in 
a previous study (Hayden et al., 2007), in which daily choice fre-
quencies were transformed to equivalent juice amounts. The model 
takes advantage of the roughly linear relationship between choice 
frequency and juice amount identified in a previous experiment 
(McCoy et al., 2003). For this study, to reduce day-to-day noise, we 
added one additional (hypothetical) choice frequency per context 
(risk: CV of 0; delay: 0 s delay on large reward; social: juice amount 
equivalent to standard).
results
Monkeys exhibit stable, ordered preferences in three 
decision contexts
Each day, monkeys performed a single task with three differ-
ent embedded decision contexts: risk, delay, and social valua-
tion, each associated with three levels of decision salience. All 
three contexts required monkeys to shift gaze in order to choose 
between two eccentric targets associated with different reward 
properties. In the risk context, monkeys chose between a risky 
option (50% chance of high reward, 50% chance of low reward) 
and a safe option (100% chance of medium reward) of equal 
expected values. We varied decision salience by changing the 
risk level (CV) of the risky option. In the delay context, monkeys 
chose between a larger, delayed amount of juice (LL: larger, later) 
and a smaller amount of juice available immediately (SS: smaller, 
sooner). Delays could either be 1, 2, or 3 s, depending on the 
block. In the social valuation context, monkeys chose between 
a large amount of juice and a small amount of juice paired with 
a photograph of a familiar monkey (mix of dominant and sub-
ordinate males). The photograph option was paired with differ-
ent small amounts of juice (small, medium, large), depending 
on the block. The safe, immediate, and non-social options were 
identical (standard) across the three contexts; only the “outlier” 
option changed according to block. Thus, the identity of the 
outlier option determined the decision context. In the risk con-
text, monkeys preferred the probabilistically rewarded option 
to the safe one (Figure 2A), as described previously (McCoy 
and Platt, 2005; Hayden et al., 2008). In the delay context, mon-
keys preferred immediate rewards to delayed ones (Figure 2B). 
Finally, in the social context, they preferred larger juice rewards 
to smaller rewards paired with photographs of familiar mon-
keys [Figure 2C; p < 0.0001 in all cases, two-tailed single-sample 
context, so monkeys always had information about whether they 
were making choices about risk, time, or social/juice reward trade-
offs. The standard and outlier options were randomly assigned to 
the two target locations at the start of each block and remained 
there for the duration of the block. On the next block of the same 
type, these assignments reversed. Thus, locations were roughly 
counterbalanced.
surgical procedures
All procedures were approved by the Duke University Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committee and were designed and conducted 
in compliance with the Public Health Service’s Guide for the Care 
and Use of Animals. Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) 
served as subjects. A small head-holding prosthesis was implanted 
in both animals using standard surgical techniques. Six weeks 
later, animals were habituated to training conditions and trained 
to perform oculomotor tasks for liquid reward. A second surgical 
procedure was then performed to place a stainless steel record-
ing chamber (Crist Instruments) over CGp at the intersection of 
the interaural and midsagittal planes. Animals received analgesics 
and antibiotics after all surgeries. Throughout both behavioral and 
physiological recording sessions, the chamber was kept sterile with 
regular antibiotic washes and sealed with sterile caps.
behavioral techniques
Monkeys  were  placed  on  controlled  access  to  fluid  outside  of 
experimental sessions. Horizontal and vertical eye positions were 
sampled at 1000 Hz by an infrared eye-monitoring camera system 
(SR Research, Osgoode, ON, USA). Stimuli were controlled by a 
computer running Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) with 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) and Eyelink Toolbox (Cornelissen 
et al., 2002). Visual stimuli were small colored squares on a com-
puter monitor placed directly in front of the animal and centered 
on his eyes. A standard solenoid valve controlled the duration of 
juice delivery. Monkeys were generally familiar with this type of 
task, and had performed one of the context types described (risk) 
previously. Monkeys performed the entire task, consisting of the 
three contexts, for at least three sessions prior to recording.
Microelectrode recording techniques
We recorded action potentials from 71 single neurons in two mon-
keys (53 in monkey N, 18 in monkey S) during the performance of 
the task. Single electrodes (Frederick Haer Co.) were lowered under 
microdrive guidance (Kopf) until the waveform of a single (1–4) 
neuron(s) was isolated. Individual action potentials were identified by 
standard criteria and isolated on a Plexon system (Plexon Inc, Dallas, 
TX, USA). Neurons were selected for recording on the basis of the 
quality of isolation only, and not on task-related response properties.
We approached CGp through a standard recording grid. CGp was 
identified using a hand-held digital ultrasound device (Sonosite 180) 
placed against the recording chamber (Glimcher et al., 2001). We 
confirmed that we were in CGp using stereotactic measurements, as 
well as by listening for characteristic sounds of white and gray matter 
during recording. CGp recordings were made in areas 23 and 31 in 
the cingulate gyrus and ventral bank of the cingulate sulcus. These 
recordings were made from areas equivalent to those reported in 
McCoy et al. (2003), Dean and Platt (2006), Hayden et al. (2008).
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chose the smaller, immediate option more often when the delay 
to the larger option was longer [F(2, 4877) = 119.8, p < 0.0001]. 
Finally, as the amount of juice associated with the photograph 
increased, monkeys were more likely to choose it [F(2, 4822) = 15.0, 
p < 0.0001].
neuronal firing rates in cgp do not track behavioral 
preferences independent of context
We first examined the neuronal response to choice of a risky, delayed, 
or social option. Figure 3 shows the firing rates of a single neuron 
to choice of the outlier option (shown in red) over the standard 
option (shown in blue). Firing rates were higher for choices of a 
social or risky option over the standard. Figure 4   demonstrates that, 
t-tests; Monkey N risk: M = 0.59, SE = 0.008, t(4247) = 11.5; 
delay: M = 0.42, SE = 0.008, t(4310) = −11.3; social: M = 0.25, 
SE = 0.007, t(4243) = −37.9; Monkey S risk: M = 0.59, SE = 0.02, 
t(708) = 4.8; delay: M = 0.41, SE = 0.02, t(726) = −4.9; social: 
M = 0.36, SE = 0.02, t(745) = −7.8]. These effects were highly 
significant for both monkeys.
As noted above, there were three different levels of the outlier 
option in each decision context (high risk, medium risk, low risk; 
long delay, medium delay, short delay; large juice, medium juice, 
small juice), meaning there were nine different possible block types 
in total (three contexts × three levels). The standard option (no risk, 
no delay, no picture) was available on all choice trials. We found 
that preference for the risky option increased with increasing CV 
in reward [F(2, 4805) = 31.5, p < 0.0001] as described previously 
(McCoy and Platt, 2005). As expected (e.g., Myerson and Green, 
Figure 2 | Behavioral preferences used to compute subjective value in 
the risky, delay, and social contexts. (A) Preferences in risk context. 
Monkeys significantly preferred a risky reward to a safe reward and had 
stronger preferences for higher levels of risk. (B) Preferences in delay 
context. Monkeys were significantly delay-averse, preferring smaller, 
immediate rewards to larger, delayed rewards, and had stronger 
preferences against longer delays. (C) Preferences in social valuation 
context. Monkeys preferred the standard juice reward to smaller rewards 
coupled with images, but were more likely to choose to view the image as 
juice volume was increased.
Figure 3 | Firing rates of a single Cgp neuron are modulated by choice 
but do not signal value independent of decision context. Plots are aligned 
to end of choice saccade (dotted line). (A) Risk context. PSTH shows average 
response of population of neurons when monkey chose the risky option (red) 
or the safe option (blue). (B) Delay context. PSTH separated by whether the 
monkey chose the LL option (red) or the SS option (blue). (C) Social valuation 
context. PSTH separated by whether the monkey chose the picture option 
(red) or the non-picture option (blue). Pre-choice modulations likely reflect 
block structure (see main text). Statistics are for correlation between 
subjective value and firing rate, within context.
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that CGp firing rates encode the subjective value of a chosen 
option.
Quantification of data from the other two contexts suggests 
otherwise. In the delay context, the population showed a higher 
firing rate when monkeys chose the delayed option than when they 
chose the immediate option, although this difference was not sig-
nificant t(70) = 0.61, p > 0.05. Although the population did not 
show significantly higher firing rates for one choice over the other, 
the activity of a substantial minority of neurons (17/71; 24%) was 
significantly modulated by choices of the larger, later (LL) reward 
over the smaller, sooner (SS) reward. Although monkeys gener-
ally preferred the SS option to the LL, roughly half (nine) of these 
neurons showed higher activity for choices of the delayed option. 
Eight of the 17 neurons significant during the post-reward epoch 
were also significantly modulated during the pre-choice epoch, five 
of them showing higher firing rates prior to choice of the LL option. 
Seven of the 17 neurons were significantly modulated during the 
peri-saccadic epoch, three of them showing higher firing rates dur-
ing choice of the LL option. Since firing rates were also generally 
higher when monkeys chose the risky option, this pattern of results is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that CGp encodes subjective value.
Finally, the population showed a significantly higher firing rate 
when monkeys chose the social option over the non-social one 
[t(70) = 2.8, p < 0.008], even though the non-social option was 
strongly preferred. Overall, 14 neurons (20%) were modulated by 
the choice of the social option over the non-social option. Of these, 
11 fired at higher rates when monkeys chose the picture. Five of 
the 14 were significantly modulated prior to saccade (three with 
higher firing rates for upcoming choice of the picture option). Six 
of the 14 were significantly modulated in the peri-saccadic epoch 
(five with higher firing rates during choice of the picture option). 
Again, these findings are inconsistent with the idea that CGp signals 
the subjective value of a chosen option independent of context. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that all of these effects can be observed in 
the activity of a single neuron: this example cell shows higher firing 
rates during choice of the outlier options relative to the standard, 
despite contrasting preferences in the three conditions.
cgp neurons do not encode subjective value independent of 
decision context
We next quantified the relationship between firing rates of CGp 
neurons and the subjective value of the chosen option. Subjective 
value signals in the brain can be identified by correlations between 
neuronal activity and the preference functions that serve as the basis 
for estimating value (cf. Montague and Berns, 2002; O’Doherty, 
2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006).
generally, average population activity was stronger when monkeys 
chose the risky option, which was preferred, but was also stronger 
when monkeys chose the delayed option and social options, which 
were not preferred.
We next quantified these effects in our population of stud-
ied neurons. During the post-reward epoch (see Materials and 
Methods), the population as a whole showed higher firing rates 
during choice of a risky option than during choice of a safe 
option [t(70) = 2.39, p = 0.02]. Overall, 19 of the 71 (27%) 
recorded neurons were significantly modulated by risky versus 
safe choice; 16 of these showed higher activity when monkeys 
chose the risky option (see Table 1). Of the 19 neurons signifi-
cantly modulated during the post-reward phase, 11 were also 
modulated by upcoming choice of the risky option prior to the 
saccade (10 with higher firing rate for risky option). Seven were 
modulated during the peri-saccadic period, six of those with 
higher firing for the risky option. Because both monkeys pre-
ferred the risky option, this positive relationship between firing 
rate and risk replicates previous behavioral and   neuronal results 
Figure 4 | The Cgp population response increases when monkeys 
choose the risky, delayed, and social options – independent of 
preference. (A) Risk context. Population PSTH separated by whether the 
monkey chose the risky option (red) or the safe option (blue). On the right is 
proportion choice of the risky (red) and safe (blue) options. (B) Delay context. 
Population PSTH separated by whether the monkey chose the LL (red) or SS 
(blue) options. On the right is proportion choice of the LL (red) and SS (blue) 
options. (C) Social valuation context. Population PSTH separated by whether 
the monkey chose the picture option (red) or non-picture option (blue). On the 
right is proportion choice of the picture (red) and non-picture (blue) options.
Table 1 | Neurons modulated by choice of the outlier option over the 
standard option within each task context.
  risk  Delay  Social/juice
Post-reward    19    17    14
Pre-choice  Peri-saccade  11  7  8  5  5  6
Numbers of neurons modulated in the pre-choice and peri-saccadic epochs are 
out of the number modulated in the post-reward epoch.
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found highly similar results. We examined whether firing rates 
matched daily choice frequencies, without any additional trans-
formations. Under this model, both the standard and non-stand-
ard options could attain different relative values across different 
contexts and levels, simply based on different preference levels. 
Results, however, were similar to other model. In the post-reward 
epoch, we observed a significant correlation between subjective 
value and firing rate in the risk context [t(70) = 2.86, p = 0.006], 
We used a measure of subjective value based on revealed pref-
erences that allowed us to assign a value estimate to each option 
across all decision contexts. Subjective value was estimated using 
the frequency of choosing the risky, delayed, and social options 
(outlier options) in each of the nine possible conditions in each 
session. For each context (risk, delay, social), we fit a line to the 
day’s preference points – one for each level of the non-standard 
option (low, medium, high risk; short, medium, long delay; small, 
medium, large juice). In a previous study (McCoy et al., 2003), we 
gave monkeys (one of whom is also used in this study) choices 
between different amounts of juice to determine the relationship 
between reward size and choice frequency. We then used that data 
to convert choice frequencies to equivalent juice values to model 
subjective value in the current study (cf. Hayden et al., 2007). For 
example, a 75% preference for the risky option over the safe one 
would be equivalent to the frequency with which monkeys choose 
220 μL over 200 μL of juice rewarded deterministically. We exam-
ined the relationship between our estimate of subjective value and 
firing rate following delivery of the reward for each neuron, within 
each context. Figure 3 shows these relationships for a single neu-
ron. In this example cell, firing rate was positively correlated with 
subjective value in the risk context, but was negatively correlated 
with subjective value in the social context.
Overall, during the post-reward epoch the population of CGp 
neurons was biased toward a positive relationship between firing 
rates and subjective value in the risk context [M = 0.066, t(70) = 3.5, 
p < 0.001, Figure 5A], biased toward a negative relationship between 
firing rates and subjective value in the social context [M = −0.064, 
t(70) = −3.67, p < 0.001, Figure 5C], and trended toward a negative 
relationship between firing rates and subjective value in the delay 
context [t(70) = −1.64, p = 0.10, Figure 5B]. This sign inversion is 
contradictory to the hypothesis of subjective value encoding. We 
also examined the relationship between firing rates and subjec-
tive value across all three decision contexts by incorporating all 
types of trials into our model. When all trials from all contexts 
and levels were included, there was no relationship between sub-
jective value and firing rate across the population [t(70) = −1.10, 
p > 0.2, Figure 5D]. We next examined whether these correlation 
coefficient distributions were not just different from zero, but also 
from each other. As expected, the risk and delay correlation coef-
ficient distributions were significantly different from each other 
[t(70) = 3.72, p = 0.0006] as were the risk and social correlation 
coefficient distributions [t(70) = 5.13, p < 0.00001], however, the 
social and delay correlation coefficient distributions were not sig-
nificantly different from each other [t(70) = 1.46, p = 0.15]. If these 
neurons were encoding subjective value, we would have expected 
little difference across conditions.
Given that CGp neurons show a weak bias for contralateral 
choices, we repeated these analyses using the original model for 
trials that only included contraversive saccades and found the same 
effects. We found qualitatively similar results to those reported for 
all saccades, but with significant (negative) encoding in the delay 
context: Risk, t(60) = 2.13, p = 0.04; Delay, t(61) = −2.04, p = 0.046; 
Social, t(61) = −2.5, p = 0.01.
In addition to this method, we recalculated our data using an 
alternative method, in case the particular model of value we chose 
biased our data against the subjective value hypothesis. Thus, 
Figure 5 | The Cgp population does not encode value independent of 
context. Histogram of correlation coefficients for subjective value (see 
Materials and Methods) for the: (A) Risk context. (B) Delay context (C) Social 
valuation context. (D) All contexts combined.
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outlier option than for the standard, regardless of decision con-
text. Combining data across all contexts, outlier choices did yield 
significantly higher firing rates during the post-reward epoch than 
standard choices, as expected based on the context-specific results 
presented above [t(70) = 2.2, p = 0.03]. Overall, 24 neurons showed 
significant differences in firing rate after choosing the outlier versus 
standard options, collapsing across all contexts and levels. Out of 
these 24 significant cells, 21 showed higher firing rates following 
choice of the outlier option than following choice of the stand-
ard option. This argues strongly for a value-independent decision 
  salience signal.
Furthermore, if CGp neurons encode decision salience this 
would predict higher firing rates for riskier, later, and smaller juice 
outlier options, as they are progressively different from the stand-
ard. Indeed, neurons responded differently to the various outlier 
options. We combined data across all contexts and regressed neuro-
nal responses for each cell against outlier level (only outlier choices). 
We found that regression coefficients were significantly skewed in 
the positive direction, meaning higher firing rates for more salient 
options [t(70) = 3.8, p < 0.001, Figure 6A]. Twenty out of 71 cells 
were significantly modulated by outlier salience (14 in the positive 
direction). Once again, although these task contexts are quite dif-
ferent, examining them all along the dimension of salience proves 
useful. This effect was not present in choices of the standard option, 
either for the post-reward or pre-choice epoch, indicating that this 
signal does not reflect overall environmental salience. Because the 
outlier option was also available on these trials, this lack of an effect 
also argues against processing of available options, and instead ties 
these signals more closely to choice.
We examined the least and most deviant outlier options from 
each context in order to more fully quantify this effect (Figure 6B). 
As reported previously (McCoy and Platt, 2005), CGp neurons fired 
a    negative  correlation  in  the  social  context  [t(70)  =  −3.37, 
p = 0.001], and a non-significant negative correlation in the delay 
context [t(70) = −0.83, p = 0.40].
Thus, although post-reward firing rates varied with which choice 
the animal made, they were not correlated with subjective value in 
a consistent fashion across decision contexts.
Given the heterogeneity in response direction amongst CGp 
neurons, we were concerned that different subsets of neurons may 
have been activated by one task over another, thus muddling the 
population results described above. We asked whether the divergent 
relationships between firing rates and subjective value observed 
across contexts were the result of separate neuronal populations 
contributing exclusively to one of the three types of decisions. When 
we divided cells into positive or negative correlations with sub-
jective value (without regard to significance) in each of the three 
contexts, we observed the largest number of cells with positive 
modulation in the risk context, negative modulation in the delay 
context, and negative modulation in the social context (18/71 cells, 
see Table 2). Furthermore, cells that were significantly modulated 
in one context were not less likely to be modulated in either of the 
other contexts than those cells that were non-significant (inde-
pendent-samples t-tests, all p > 0.1). For example, neurons that 
showed an effect of subjective value in the risk context were not 
less likely to signal value in the delay context than cells that did not 
signal value in the risk context. This was also true for choice effects 
(e.g., risky versus safe). Indeed, neurons with higher firing rates 
for delayed choice over standard (without regard to significance) 
fired at higher rates for picture choices and risky choices versus the 
standard option (p < 0.05 in both cases). Likewise, neurons with 
higher firing rates following risky choices also had higher firing 
rates following picture choices, relative to the standard (p = 0.03), 
and vice-versa (p < 0.02). Collectively, these results suggest that 
there are not special populations of neurons that only respond to 
decisions involving risk, delay, or social information in CGp. Rather, 
the relationship between firing rates and value, as estimated from 
revealed preferences, differs depending on context.
firing rates of cgp neurons vary with decision salience
The observed pattern of results – higher activity for choice of a 
risky, delayed, or social option compared to the standard (certain, 
immediate, non-social) option – suggest the hypothesis that CGp 
neurons signal the deviation of the chosen option from an anchor 
(in this case, the standard option), that is, decision salience, rather 
than the subjective value of the chosen option. If this were the 
Table 2 | Number of neurons with firing rates modulated positively and 
negatively by subjective value, according to decision context.
  D+  D− 
r+  8  9  S+
r+  11  18  S−
r−  4  7  S+
r−  7  7  S−
R, risk; D, delay; S, social. “+” indicates a positive relationship between firing 
rate and value; “−” indicates a negative relationship.
Figure 6 | Firing rates of Cgp neurons track decision salience. (A) 
Histogram of regression coefficients for firing rates as a function of choice 
salience for all neurons in the population. (B) Average population response 
was significantly higher for choosing high risk (versus low risk) and low juice 
(versus high juice) options. Higher firing rates were associated with options 
more different from the standard.
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ing about unusual events. That being said, we do not think this sig-
nal fits with simple cue processing for associative learning. Instead, 
these signals seem to track the salience of the chosen option. One 
way to examine this is to compare trials on which the monkey chose 
the standard option even though the outlier option was also avail-
able. If this signal reflects broader option or cue processing, then 
the neural signal should track salience regardless of option chosen. 
Instead, firing rates when the standard option was chosen do not 
vary based on the salience of the outlier option. Thus, although 
we believe these signals to be useful for learning, at this point we 
remain agnostic as to the details of this process.
Our lab previously showed that firing rates of neurons within 
CGp predict preferences for chosen options in a risky choice task 
similar to the one used here (McCoy and Platt, 2005). The present 
study replicates those previous results. By contrast, our finding that 
the CGp population tends to respond more strongly when monkeys 
choose the delayed but non-preferred option conflicts with a recent 
fMRI paper which found that hemodynamic responses in human 
CGp vary with subjective value in a delay discounting task (Kable 
and Glimcher, 2007; Levy et al., 2011). The discrepancy between 
the present study and these earlier findings may reflect species 
differences in neuronal processing, differences in task design (i.e., 
the use of primary versus monetary rewards), or discontinuities 
between the BOLD signal and single unit firing (Logothetis et al., 
2001). Other studies have suggested the BOLD signal in CGp is 
stronger during decisions concerning delay than risk (Weber and 
Huettel, 2008). Furthermore, Luhmann et al. (2008) reported in a 
recent paper that activation of human CGp increased with choice 
of a delayed reward – an effect we confirmed on the level of the 
single neuron. They hypothesized that such signals may be linked 
to self-projected time rather than decision processing. Firing rate 
modulations observed here, however, suggest that CGp activation 
may not indicate self-projection specifically, but may instead reflect 
neural processing involved in tracking salience.
Overall, our findings suggest that CGp signals decision salience 
or even uncertainty more broadly (Critchley et al., 2001; Behrens 
et al., 2007). The consistently higher firing rates we observed for the 
“outlier” options (risky, delayed, social) may signal deviation from 
standard or predicted outcomes, a variable important in attentional 
models of learning (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980). Such 
a signal would indicate when and how rapidly learning or behavioral 
adjustment would occur, but would not provide information about 
precisely what should be learned. Consistent with this idea, a previ-
ous study found that firing rates of CGp neurons were higher when 
monkeys explored their options than when they pursued a single 
source of reward (Pearson et al., 2009), a pattern consistent with 
the idea that CGp neurons signal decision salience. With prominent 
connections to the medial temporal lobes, CGp is well-positioned 
anatomically to provide an instructional signal to engage learning.
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at higher rates when monkeys chose the risky option with the   highest 
CV compared with when monkeys chose the risky option with the 
lowest CV [t(70) = 3.33, p = 0.001, paired-samples t-test]. In the 
social context, neurons fired at higher rates during the post-reward 
epoch when monkeys chose the picture paired with the smallest 
amount of juice (most different from standard) compared with 
when monkeys chose the picture paired with the largest amount of 
juice [t(68) = −2.41, p = 0.019]. In the case of delayed rewards, firing 
rates were higher when monkeys chose the 3-s delayed option than 
when they chose the 1-s delayed option, although this difference 
was not significant [t(69) = −1.69, p = 0.096]. However, as clearly 
evident in the population response (Figure 4), firing rates during 
LL choices were higher during the delay period than prior to the 
choice, meaning neurons increased their responses during the delay, 
in anticipation of the reward [t(70) = 2.5, p = 0.015]. This effect 
disappears following reward delivery, when firing rates return to 
pre-choice baselines (p > 0.9). Given our other results, this suggests 
that the delay period itself was the more salient outlying feature in 
this context. Thus, firing rates were consistently higher when the 
outlier option deviated more from the standard, strongly suggest-
ing that CGp encodes decision salience rather than the subjective 
value of a chosen option.
We considered the possibility that these results could be explained 
by a relatively simple arousal signal. We assessed whether there was 
a consistent relationship between firing rate and reaction time in 
this task. Previous studies have showed that, in certain contexts, 
CGp activity increases with slower reaction times (Hayden et al., 
2009), as tonic increases in firing rate in CGp are associated with 
task disengagement (Raichle et al., 2001). However, here, we did not 
observe any consistent relationship across cells between firing rate 
and reaction time (mean correlation coefficient = 0.011, p = 0.4), 
even when only examining significant cells (p = 0.3). Moreover, 
the bias toward higher firing rates during choice of outlier options 
relative to the standard option was maintained while controlling 
for reaction times, t(70) = 3.36, p = 0.001.
discussion
Our data show that CGp neurons do not signal behavioral prefer-
ences consistently across different decision contexts. The population 
of CGp neurons responded with higher firing rates when monkeys 
chose the risky option, which was preferred, and the delayed and 
social options, which were non-preferred. Furthermore, firing rates 
increased as delay and risk increased, and as amount of juice associ-
ated with the social option decreased. These data demonstrate that 
CGp does not track subjective value in a manner that is independent 
of the type of decision being made. Instead, CGp neurons appear 
to encode variables that sometimes covary with preference.
One such variable is what we are calling decision salience: neu-
rons tended to fire at higher rates when the chosen option was more 
aberrant from the standard option available on every trial. This type 
of outlier encoding may be useful for guiding learning and memory 
(Pearce and Hall, 1980), a function previously linked to CGp (Cabeza 
and Nyberg, 2000; Maddock et al., 2003; McCoy et al., 2003).
We have operationally defined decision salience purely in the 
context of choosing outcomes that deviate from a standard option. 
Unfortunately, the task we used was not designed to examine learn-
ing, but rather to examine preference signals across distinct   decision 
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